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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F R A N C I S A. C U T L E R , 
Plaintiff, I 
[ Case No. 
D A L E B O W E N and SALT L A K E I 1 3 5 5 4 
CITY R E L O C A T I O N AGENCY, \ 
Defendants. 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
Dale Bo wen 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is an action commenced by the plaintiff 
against the defendant Dale Bowen to declare a busi-
ness relationship to be a partnership and to recover 
$5,000 paid out as "relocating moneys" paid in lieu 
of moving and related expenses, together with $178.45 
more in payment of inventory items claimed due plain-
tiff as defendant's partner. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N O F T H E CASE B Y T H E 
L O W E R COURT 
The lower court held the appellee is entiled to $4900 
of the relocation money in savings, with accrued interest 
thereon, plus an amount of $6.52, which was the bal-
ance of the $100 retained by the Relocation Agency 
(to pay expenses accruing), plus a judgment of 
$12407. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the trial court's award of the savings 
account, the check for $6.52 and the judgment of the 
plaintiff, based on the court's conclusion that a part-
nership existed between the parties. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The appellant owned and operated a Salt Lake 
City beer tavern, the Havana Club; his manager, Pete 
Kakunes, was quitting and he called the appellant at 
his ranch in Idaho in June 1968 to so advise him and 
to recommend the appellee as his successor. (R. 118B) 
She was then a night bartender at the Havana Club. 
(R-61, 79B) On June 20th 1968 the appellant re-
turned to Salt Lake, met with Kakunes and with the 
appellee (whether jointly or separately is in dispute), 
concerning her succeeding Kakunes (who had purchased 
a tavern of his own), as manager of the Havana Club. 
(R. 63, 77B, 78B, 80B, 8lB, 90B, 9lB, 117B, 118B). 
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Appellee accepted Mr. Bowen's offer to work as 
his manager (appellee claims his offer was to make her 
his partner). She contributed only her time and labor. 
(R-64) She was to draw $100 per week and receive 
y% of the profits each year, after all expenses were paid, 
with appellant receiving a similar amount. (R-88,118B, 
119B) Appellee was authorized by the appellant to 
hire and fire, bank the moneys, pay the bills, and keep 
the records for the accountant, Ronald Kingsbury. (R-
66, 121B, 156B) Appellant worked with her for two 
or three days and then returned to Idaho, leaving her 
to manage the club. (R-66, 67, 119B) There was no 
writing concerning plaintiff's status. (R-89) 
This arrangement continued up to and including 
April 9th, 1972. However, in late 1971 the parties were 
notified by the Salt Lake Relocation Agency that the 
land the Havana Club was on was to be taken for the 
new Salt Palace project, and said appellant would have 
to relocate his business. (R-67, Exh. P-1) Appellant 
sold his idaho property in late 1971 (R-117B) and 
came back to his home in Salt Lake. In January or 
February 1972, appellant with these sales funds, pur-
chased a tavern, the Apex Bar, also in Salt Lake City, 
and operated it. (R-95, 123B, 142B) I t was compar-
able in size and operation to the Havana Club. (R-123) 
He hired another manager to operate this bar, without 
objection from the appellee. (R-96, 97,124B) 
The parties were given notice to vacate by midnight 
April 25, 1972, and they closed the Havana Club on 
April 9, 1972. (Exh. P-1, R-75) Meanwhile, the 
3 
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parties searched, without success, for another bar which 
Mrs. Cutler was to manage for the appellant. One 
prospective buy, the N.C. Bar, fell through when the 
owners decided to keep it for their family, and no other 
bar locations were found. (R-69, 70, 71, 72,125B, 126B, 
117B). 
The Re-Location Agency notified the parties that 
the volume of business done by the Havana Club quali-
fied it to receive the maximum relocation payment of 
$10,000, provided certain other options were not ex-
ercised by the club. Appellant told the Relocation Ag-
ency that he would take the $10,000. (R-l 16) In April 
1972 a check for $5,000 was prepared and delivered to 
the appellant. (Exh. 10-D, R-75B) However, at the 
request of the appellee to the Agency, both parties 
names were put on the check, dated April 5, 1972. At 
this time, the N.C. Bar purchase was still being nego-
tiated ; Mr. Bowen requested Mrs. Cutler, the appellee, 
to endorse the check, which she did. Appellant then 
deposited the check in his personal account. (R-126B, 
128B) 
Before the second check, which was for $4,900 
($100 was held out for incidental expenses payable) 
was delivered, appellee had her attorney accompany her 
and Mr. Bowen, the appellant, to the Relocating Ag-
ency to receive this check which was also made out in 
both names. (R-146B, 147B) Mr. Bowen denied that 
Mrs. Cutler was entitled to any part of the $10,000, 
which was paid "in lieu of moving and related ex-
penses". Mrs. Cutler told Mr. Bowen that she was his 
4 
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partner and that the $4,900 check was hers. Unable to 
agree, the parties deposited this check in a joint savings 
account, pending the outcome of this litigation (R-73, 
74) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
A P A Y M E N T " IN L I E U OF MOVING 
A N D R E L A T E D E X P E N S E S " M A D E TO AN 
O W N E R O F A B U S I N E S S W H O IS B E I N G 
V A C A T E D A N D D I S P L A C E D IS NOT 
M O N E Y T H A T S H O U L D B E S H A R E D 
W I T H T H E "MANAGER" OR "MANAGER-
P A R T N E R " W H O H E L P S TO O P E R A T E H I S 
B U S I N E S S . 
In this operation of a tavern business, the appellee 
contributed her time and efforts, nothing more. (R-64, 
122B) The appellant owned the lease, the licenses, the 
equipment, and the inventory. (R-122B, 133B, 146B, 
149B) Exh. 17-D, consisting of three pages from the 
Relocation Handbook of the Salt Lake Relocation Ag-
ency, sets out the pertinent data concerning the general 
information and eligibility requirements to qualify for 
"Payment In Lieu Of Moving and Related Expenses." 
This was the $10,000 item being litigated in this law-
suit. The Director of the Relocation Agency, Mr. 
Wright, stated that the information he had was that the 
appellant was the owner and appellee was the manager 
5 
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of the Havana Club. When asked why the two checks 
given in payment of the $10,000, were made to both 
parties jointly, he didn't answer directly, but said they 
could have "probably made it strictly to the Havana 
Club". (R-117). On further questioning, Mr. Wright 
said both parties were agreeable on the first check being 
made out jointly. Appellant's attorney raised the point 
that since appellant had acquired another property (the 
Apex Bar) before the money was paid that there was 
concern that none of the $10,000 could be paid. The 
witness stated that the Denver regional office considered 
the Apex Bar a replacement, even though acquired prior 
to the actual moving, so there was no problem in making 
the payment. (R-118). On cross-examination Mr. 
Wright stated that Mrs. Cutler's name did not need to 
be on the check in order for payment to be made, and 
that appellants' acquiring the Apex Bar didn't in any 
manner require her to be one of the payees. (R-119) 
The reason appellee's name was on the two checks with 
the appellant was because the appellee had so requested 
it a number of times, and Mr. Bowen had voiced no 
objection until after the second check had been issued. 
Mr. Wright further stated that this $10,000, is not re-
portable as income, nor taxable as income. (R-120) 
Whatever relationship existed here between the 
parties, it terminated at the close of business on April 
9,1972 when the Havana Club quit business. (R-145B, 
146B) 
On an accounting basis, assuming there was a part-
nership, each partner should have received back what 
6 
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each contributed, and after payment of bills, the moneys 
in the cash register, the safe and the bank should have 
been equally divided, per their agreement. This was 
done. 
The appellant, Mr. Bowen, had contributed the 
premises, the lease, licenses, equipment, inventory and 
a going business when Mrs. Cutler changed from being 
his night bartender to manager (or partner, for the 
sake of argument at this point). However, the licenses, 
equipment and inventory were all he salvaged from 
having to relocate. The $10,000 payment to him was to 
help make him "whole". 
The appellee, Mrs. Cutler, received back what she 
contributed, her time and talents. She had not requested 
that her job be continued elsewhere by Mr. Bowen. 
(R-146B) 
The wages due and profits remaining were equally 
divided between her and him on April 10, 1972, the day 
after the business closed. (R-131B) 
The relocation expenses of $10,000 were to make 
up for "a substantial loss of (its) existing patronage, 
which business contributed materially to the income of 
the "displaced owner" (emphasis ours), together with 
the actual cost of moving, and related expenses. (Exh. 
17-D) All Mrs. Cutler had, or claimed, was one half 
of the "cash register" of the business, in addition to 
her $100 per week draw. (R-88, 118B, 119B) 
The appellee terminated her relationship with Mr. 
Bowen when she didn't continue working for him, either 
7 
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at the Apex or elsewhere, especially if she were a part-
ner. If she weren't a partner, she certainly had no 
claim to a part of the $10,000. If she were a partner 
as to the profits of the business, which is all that she 
claimed to be, repeatedly, that is all that she is entitled 
to participate in. Profits are reportable and taxable, as 
income. Moneys paid in lieu of expenses to relocate, 
as here, are not. 
The appellee breached the whole concept of re-
locating by not insisting to appellant Bowen that she 
was entitled to her job with him now that he had re-
located in the Apex, or place her in some other club, 
since she needed, and was entitled to, her job. Appellee 
had no interest in, nor was she entitled to anything but 
the profits from the business. However, the trial court 
awarded her the second check of $4,900 being held pres-
ently in a joint savings account by the parties. 
In summary, appellee admittedly had no interest in 
the physical properties making up the business, nor the 
lease, nor licenses. By awarding her the second check 
amounting to $4,900, the court, in effect, gave her an 
interest in these items, and made it retroactive, contrary 
to her own testimony. 
In further summary, the Havana Bar was re-lo-
cated at the Apex Bar on the basis of this $10,000 
which was granted and needed to move and to re-stab-
lish a good business of customers and patrons. The 
appellee, Mrs. Cutler, did not continue for Mr. Bowen 
as manager (or partner) of the bar. Therefore, the 
8 
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manager job (or partnership) was dissolved. And the 
relocation money could in no way be construed to be an 
asset in April 1972. I t had, in effect, been spent when 
the re-location was made to the Apex Bar two or three 
months earlier. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E I N T E N T I O N O F T H E P A R T I E S IS 
D E C I S I V E I N D E T E R M I N I N G T H E E X I S T -
E N C E OF A P A R T N E R S H I P ; W H E R E I T IS 
C L E A R L Y ONE O F E M P L O Y M E N T , NO 
P A R T N E R S H I P W I L L BE F O U N D . 
Numerous cases hold that the intention of the 
parties to be partners, with mutual consent evident, 
must be manifested by the terms of their agreement, 
their contract toward each other, or by the surrounding 
circumstances of the transaction in question. Burnett 
v. Lemon, 185 Or. 54, 199 P2d 910; Leeds v. Town-
send, 228 111 451, 81 N E 1069; Porter v. Moore, 130 
Mont. 259; 300 P2d 513. Tripp V. Ghubb, 69 Ariz. 81, 
208 P2d 312; Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Ut 2d 159, 330 
P2d 122; Benson v. Rozelle, 85 Ut. 582, 39 P2d 1113. 
59 Am. Jur. 2d 961, 962, 979. 
The mere fact that the parties call themselves part-
ners, or refer to their business relation as a partner-
ship will not necessarily make them partners, nor their 
business a partnership. Bradbury v. Nagelhus, 132 
Mont 417, 319 P2d 503; Cruickshank v. Lid, 158 
Wash. 523, 291 P 485; Wagner v. Buttles, 151 Wis. 
668,139 N.W. 425. 
9 
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A recent Arizona case involved a man and woman, 
who had lived together and operated various liquor 
establishments both before and during marriage. The 
trial court held that they had not intended to operate 
the businesses as partners, or that the property, which 
was held by the wife in her name alone, would be held 
as community property. I t is Myrland v. Myrland, 19 
Ariz. App. 498; 508 P2d 757. 
Some aspects of this case are similar to this one 
between Mrs. Cutler and Mrs. Bowen. The man, an 
employee manager, claimed the partnership existed. 
Mr. Myrland began work as a bartender in 1942, 
but also supervised some remodeling, all of which the 
owner, a Mrs. Lester paid for. Shortly thereafter, ac-
cording to Mr. Myrland, they agreed to jointly operate 
a tavern for profit. He then worked on an hourly basis 
and was paid in cash. In 1947, Mr. Myrland, at Mrs. 
Lester's request, moved in with her. They sold the 
tavern and built a new one partly from the earnings of 
the tavern which they had sold. The appellant assisted 
Mrs. Lester in numerous ways in the construction of 
the new building, and, being a disbarred lawyer, was 
conversant with business transactions. A year later, 
Mrs. Lester sold the new Bar and leased the premises. 
For two years they lived on the proceeds from the sale 
and the rental income, and then Mrs. Lester purchased 
some more property, a bar business, which they oper-
ated, and devoted substantially all their time to its 
operation. In 1951 Arizona condemned part of Mrs. 
Lester's property and she received $17,000, which was 
10 
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paid on the mortgage on the property. The next year 
these two were married. In 1966, another State con-
demnation action was started on the same property; 
Mrs. Myrland received $51,000; she was also receiving 
more than one thousand dollars per month in rentals. 
She had $82,000 in various banks; $15,000 of it was in 
a joint account with Mr. Myrland. The question of 
partnership then arose when marital troubles started. 
Appellant had control over the moneys, could take ad-
vances, and did so. However, the court held, in the last 
analysis, that facts, circumstances, and "most import-
ant", the intention of the parties control. 
The court held that "a participation in profits does 
not necessarily constitute the recipient a legally re-
sponsible partner, in the absence of such fundamental 
requisites as intention, co-ownership of the business, 
community of interest, and community of power in ad-
ministration." The needed intent to form a partnership 
was lacking, particularly where the wife controlled her 
property and income and denied any intent to form a 
partnership agreement. "One cannot make a leap; from 
a special or unusual financial and social relationship 
and convert it into a legal partnership, where certain 
critical indicia are absent", the court stated, in reaffirm-
ing the lower court's decision. 
The appellant here, Dale Bowen, had previously 
hired managers for various clubs which he operated, and 
had been in at least one partnership. He stated that 
Kakunes had been his manager at the Havana Club 
until he left, and he presently had a manager at the 
11 
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Apex. The appellee testified that she had owned two 
taverns, and had bought out a partner in one of them, 
had "run" another tavern and had also worked for Pete 
Kakunes at the Round-Up before coming to the Ha-
vana, she said. (R-60,116B, 117B). However, appellee, 
although having worked five months or more for Mr. 
Kakunes in 1968 at the Havana Club, before taking 
over as manager, did not know whether he was a man-
ager or partner there. She denied that he asked her if 
she was interested in becoming manager of the Havana, 
but quoted him as saying, "there might be a good job 
for me if I played my cards right . . ." (R-87, 88). 
Mrs. Cutler, the appellee, testified that she claimed 
no interest in the inventory or personal property at the 
Havana Club but wanted the profit from the business, 
"split halfway down on everything". (R-66B) 
The public accountant, Ronald L. Kingsbury, 
called as a witness by the appellee, testified that the 
club's books were to be set up as a partnership, "on the 
basis of Mrs. Cutler being manager". (R-49). How-
ever, on cross-examination, the witness testified that 
appellee was not actually to be a partner, but a man-
ager, and was to get her compensation from the busi-
ness. The witness further admitted, on cross examina-
tion, that although the state and federal tax forms, 
most of them at least, were set up showing a partner-
ship, that Form 1065, the federal partnership form, was 
the only one available for use where there was a divi-
sion of profits between individuals. (R-107-110) 
12 
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The only other witness for the appellee, Mr. 
Wright, of the Salt Lake Relocation Agency, as pre-
viously mentioned under Point I, of this brief, testified 
on direct examination that Mr. Bowen was the owner 
and Mrs. Cutler was the manager (R-116). He further 
testified, when cross-examined, that there was no need 
for Mrs. Cutler's name to be on the checks, totally 
$10,000, and that there was no problem arising from 
the fact that Mr. Bowen had found and purchased an-
other beer tavern in January or February before the 
April closing of the Havana Club, although Mrs. Cut-
ler had told Mr. Bowen that there would be unless her 
name was also put on the check. (R-118,119) 
None of the employees who worked at the Havana 
Club between 1968 and 1972, while Mrs. Cutler was 
either manager or partner, were called by her to testify 
that she had told them, by words, acts, or conduct that 
she was more than a manager, and was, namely a part-
ner of Dale Bowen. (R-58, 61B) 
In the closing moments of the trial, the appellee 
did ask to have one witness to testify that Mr. Bowen 
had introduced Mrs. Cutler as his partner. 
Counsel for Mr. Bowen stipulated that appellant 
"may have introduced her as a partner to someone 
sometime". The stipulation was accepted and the trial 
was concluded. (R-162B) 
Aside from the above summary, no one, except the 
appellee, with her uncorroborated testimony, presented 
any evidence of a partnership existing here during the 
13 
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nearly four years of operation. Only when advised by 
the Salt Lake Relocation Agency that an amount up 
to $10,000 was available for moving and relocating ex-
penses, did the manager decide to include herself in as 
a full partner. In effect, she leap-frogged herself, 
(after only five months of employment) from night 
bar tender to partner and co-owner of an established 
tavern business. 
None of the four witnesses for the appellant, 
messrs Kakunes, Jones, Allen or Sisneros testified, 
either on direct or cross-examination, that the appellee 
was a partner with the appellant, Dale Bowen. All 
four had been, or were, full or part-time employees at 
the Havana Club while the appellee, Francis Cutler, 
was there as manager, except for Mr. Kakunes, who 
left after he obtained the job for her from Mr. Bowen. 
(R-77,79, 92,104, 113). 
A former employee, Jack Allen, testified, as did 
Mr. Sisneros, a part-time employee at the Apex, that 
they had re-paid to the appellee loans made by the club 
to them shortly before, or at the time, the Havana Club 
closed. None of these were reported collected by the 
appellee to the appellant. She maintained that no 
I.O.U.s were paid after the Havana Club closed. Mr. 
Allen had borrowed some moneys from the Havana 
Club, through the appellee, in the spring of 1972 and 
had repaid all but $20. H e testified that in the fall of 
the year of 1972 that Mrs. Cutler asked him to pay it 
and he subsequently met her at the Broadway Lounge 
one morning at 9 o'clock paid her $20, and she gave 
14 
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him the I.O.U. He said he was working at the Los 
Angeles Bar at the time. (R-99B, 103B, 104B) 
Mr. Sisneros testified that he was a regular bor-
rower from the Havana Club, where he was also em-
ployed. His disability check came the first part of each 
month, he said; in April 1972 he repaid the obligation 
due, and just before the club closed on April 9th he 
asked Mrs. Cutler for $70, for rent, which she gave 
him. He testified that he repaid the $70 the first of 
May 1972 to Mrs. Cutler at the "73" Club. (R-108B, 
111B, 112B, 113B, 114B) 
These two witnesses, Allen and Sisneros, seemed 
fiercely proud, as they testified, concerning their trust-
worthiness in repayment of the funds borrowed at the 
time and place indicated. Appellee's counsel could not 
confuse them nor get them to vary their testimony in 
this regard. Appellee denied that Allen had borrowed 
from the club, stating that it was her personal money, 
and that he had repaid her. She claimed Sisneros re-
paid his loan immediately after the club closed, con-
trary to his recollection and testimony. (R-158, 159B) 
Concerning the creation of this business relation-
ship, the appellant, Kakunes, (the manager who was 
quitting) and Orville Jones, the afternoon bartender 
on duty, each testified that there was a three way meet-
ing on June 20, 1968 between the appellee, Kakunes, 
and the appellant, at least for the initial part of the 
discussion. (R-78B, 79B, 9lB) 
Mrs. Cutler testified that only she and the appel-
15 
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lant met and talked and that he had offered her a part-
nership. (R-63) She further stated, on cross examina-
tion that, as a partner, she would work as often as she 
wanted to. (R 88) Appellee received a draw of $100 
per week, whether the business warranted it or not, 
which would indicate she was not to participate in any 
losses the business incurred. (R-118B) When the Ha-
vana closed, appellee asked for an accounting only on 
the moneys received from the operation of the business, 
(plus y% of the relocation moneys) and cared nothing 
of the sale or disposition of the equipment or inventory 
of the business. (R-98, 99,100) 
Although the appellee testified that she had owned 
and operated bars, she displayed a lack of business 
knowledge when she ignored the club's monthly bank 
statements, and relied, instead, on her own check stub 
accounting. When the club closed, appellee informed 
appellant that there was $849.70 in the bank which, 
after the bills were paid, would leave $154.55 balance 
to divide. The bank statements showed in excess of 
$2,000 in the account for the end of March and April 
1972. On May 16, 1972 after he had received several 
unpaid Havana Club bills, appellant was advised, in 
writing, by the bank that there was $2267.85 in the 
checking account (Exh. 11-D, R-97, 98). Appellee 
stated she made no further bank deposits after the club 
closed on April 9th, and could not explain the differ-
ence of $1,418.15. Thereupon, on May 19, 1972, Mr. 
Bowen testified that he withdrew $1537.79 of the funds, 
of which $850.00 was for unpaid bills, and $687.79 was 
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one half of the remainder. A like sum was left for Mrs. 
Cutler, which she withdrew on June 6th, 1972, thus 
closing the Havana Club checking account. Mr. Bowen 
explained his opinion of the difference by stating that 
he believed that appellee was out to cheat him. (R-131B, 
132B, 133B). 
There was also testimony by the appellant, on 
cross-examination, that he had every intention to ac-
quire a bar to have the appellee operate for him. How-
ever, when he found out, in late March or early April 
1972, that she was claiming one-half of the relocation 
money, he lost his enthusiasm to find another bar. (R-
143B, 147B). He further stated that when he requested 
Mr. Kingsbury, their public accountant, to set up the 
books for the club, he never told him to indicate that 
appellee was a partner, but relied on his experience as 
an accountant. This was one more indication that there 
was no intention by the owner of the Havana club to 
make appellee his partner. 
The partnership statutes of Utah which are mean-
ingful in this fact situation are 48-1-1, 48-1-3 and 48-
1-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
CONCLUSION 
I t is respectfully submitted that the trial court was 
in error when it held that the facts and the evidence 
were sufficient to find there was a partnership here. 
Appellant urges this court to hold, as a matter of law, 
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that no partnership existed, and the relationship here 
was that of employer and manager. 
However, even if a partnership were held to exist, 
it should only be a partnership as to the income of the 
business, which were the "cash register" profits, and did 
not pertain to the relocation moneys, which were paid 
by the government Agency to move and to re-establish 
the appellant owner in a new business location. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERRILL K. DAVIS 
Suite 320, 72 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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